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Abstract: 
This article interrogates recent policy pronouncements around the promotion of emerging 
financial technologies (fintech) as means of enabling financial inclusion. It is argued that 
situating this emergent ‘turn to technology’ in the context of a longer-running pattern of failed 
efforts to promote the development of financial markets for the poor in the global south offers us 
a useful lens on the dynamics of neoliberalism. The article develops this analysis by drawing 
together interlinked discussions of ‘neoliberal reason’ highlighting the central role played by the 
diffusion of market institutions in neoliberal projects with Marxian discussions highlighting the 
crucial underlying role of labour in enabling the operation of markets. In this context the appeal 
to ever-more fine-grained information with which to allocate credit underlying the turn to 
technology can both be read as yet another attempt to ‘re-engineer’ the market, and also seen as a 
doomed project. Empirically, this argument is fleshed out through an engagement with key 
framework documents around financial inclusion and technology from the World Bank and G20. 
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Introduction 
One of the flagship outcomes of the World Bank and IMF’s Joint Annual Meetings for 2018 was 
the ‘Bali Fintech Agenda’ (BFA). The BFA was launched with considerable fanfare by a panel 
featuring Bank of England Governor Mark Carney, IMF President Christine Lagarde, World 
Bank President Jim Yong Kim, South African Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago, and 
Indonesian Finance Minister Sri Mulyani and Indonesian President Joko Widodo. The BFA 
follows a number of similar pronouncements. Notably, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
(AFI), a network of central banks and finance ministries, announced the ‘Sochi Accord on 
Fintech for Financial Inclusion’ the month previous (AFI 2018), and the G20 published a set of 
‘High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion’ (HLPs) in 2016 (GPFI 2016). These 
documents reflect an emerging consensus around fintech as a means of supporting ‘financial 
inclusion’ -- the extension of access to a range of financial services to the poor, primarily in the 
global south. 
 
This article interrogates this recent ‘turn to technology’. This is an important task because the 
turn to technology offers us a lens on key trends in neoliberal development governance. 
Financial inclusion, as several authors have argued, is a paradigmatically neoliberal approach to 
poverty (Soederberg 2014; Price 2019). Indeed, financial inclusion has increasingly been 
substituted in policy discussions for ‘microcredit’, about which critics argued the same (e.g. 
Rankin 2001; Bateman 2010). The assumption that enabling greater access to formal savings, 
credit, and insurance will lead to reductions in poverty epitomizes neoliberal logics seeking to 
extend markets and market-like devices into ever-wider areas of social life. Yet, financial 
inclusion also has to be viewed as a failure, even on its own terms, as the results of efforts to 
expand ‘access’ to financial services have often been much slower and more uneven than 
advocates expected.  
 
In this article, I argue that the turn to technology represents an effort to grapple with the limits of 
(financial) markets and the difficulties in constructing them. These limits are ultimately rooted in 
a fundamental contradiction: the reason why the poor are held to need greater access to credit, 
savings, and insurance (namely, low and unpredictable incomes) is precisely the same reason 
why they are ‘bad’ credit risks, and why savings or insurance products are often ill-suited. These 
fundamental and persistent limits to the project of financial inclusion, though, are mystified in 
the turn to technology by a focus on the technical intricacies of constructing markets. Ultimately, 
the turn to technology thus needs to be understood as a fraught response to repeated failures in 
development governance.  
 
The article makes this case in four steps. The first section below examines the specific contents 
of the BFA, G20 HLPs, and Sochi Accord. The next section develops an understanding of 
neoliberalism, drawing on interlinked discussions of a ‘neoliberal reason’ highlighting the central 
role played by the diffusion of market institutions and speculative logics in neoliberal projects 
(e.g. Mirowski 2009; Peck 2010; Konings 2016) and critical discussions of ‘markets’ (e.g. 
Christophers 2014; Cahill 2019), complemented by engagements with Marx highlighting the 
crucial underlying role of labour in enabling the operation of markets. The next section applies 
this framework in situating the turn to technology in the wider trajectory of policies for ‘financial 
inclusion’. The final section reconsiders the limits of fintech in light of this discussion. 
 
In presenting this argument, the paper makes three contributions. First, while it has been 
common to critique ‘financial inclusion’ as a ‘neoliberal’ project, reflections on what its troubled 
trajectory can tell us about neoliberalism have been much rarer. This is an important gap to 
address because the trajectory of financial inclusion and fintech offers a lens on the fragile nature 
of the ‘market’ itself as a social form and the troubled processes of failure and adaptation 
underlying neoliberalization (see Brenner et al. 2010; Best 2016).  
 
Second, much of the critical literature on microcredit and financial inclusion in general (e.g. 
Aitken 2013; Mader 2018; Gruffydd-Jones 2012), and on emergent fintech applications in 
particular (e.g. Aitken 2017; Gabor and Brooks 2017), has tended to treat financial inclusion as 
an extension of processes of financialization, particularly following the literature on the 
financialization of daily life (Martin 2002). The latter refers to a process in which everyday uses 
of financial techniques and subjectivities have become increasingly ‘inescapable’, in Hall’s 
(2012: 407) evocative terms. Contributions treating fintech in this light (e.g. Aitken 2017; Gabor 
and Brooks 2017) have usefully highlighted important pathologies of emergent applications, 
particularly tendencies towards panoptic surveillance of everyday life and the concurrent 
production of new modes of discipline and stratification. But treating fintech as an extension of 
financialization often makes it much harder to give sufficient attention either to the political 
dynamics underlying the turn to technology, or the somewhat truncated character of its actual 
roll-out. In developing an analysis of the turn to technology emphasizing the uneven 
development of neoliberal logics of marketization, this article thus makes a contribution to 
emerging literatures on the analytic and empirical limits to financialization (e.g. Christophers 
2015; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage 2017). 
 
Finally, and relatedly, in highlighting ways in which the turn to technology has sought to respond 
to underlying limits of market-making, this article calls attention to the centrality of labour and 
livelihoods in explaining the uneven progress of neoliberalization. In this sense, this trajectory 
should probably serve as a caution against eliding processes of neoliberalization and 
financialization. Neoliberalism and financialization are often seen as conjoined processes (e.g. 
Fine 2013; Fine and Saad-Filho 2017; Duménil and Levy 2004). The turn to technology suggests 
that this relationship is more troubled in practice than is often assumed. Indeed, the evidence 
below suggests that broader effects of neoliberal reforms on labour markets across the global 
south may even have made the extension of certain kinds of financial accumulation harder. As a 
number of authors have noted: precarious, irregular, and informal forms of work are decidedly 
on the rise, particularly across the global south, processes that have often been exacerbated by 
neoliberal reforms (see Selwyn 2014; Harris and Scully 2015). The series of failures and 
adaptations mapped out in this article would seem to suggest that this increased precarity has 
hindered the development of at least some kinds of financial accumulation. It’s on this point that 
engagements with Marx around markets and fetishism, the ways in which financial markets 
obscure yet remain reliant on particular configurations of productive activity, are particularly 
useful. 
 
Fintech for financial inclusion: an emerging (neoliberal) consensus 
Taken together, the BFA, Sochi Accord and HLPS point to an emerging consensus around a set 
of potential benefits of fintech and of emergent risks and areas for regulatory intervention. Four 
key points are worth underlining. 
 
First, the BFA, HLPs, and Sochi Accord are non-binding statements of principles. The 
background paper to the BFA, for instance, is explicit that ‘The Agenda does not represent the 
work program of the IMF or the World Bank, nor does it aim to provide specific guidance or 
policy advice at this stage’ (WB/IMF 2018: 10). They are, in this sense, reflective of a wider use 
of ‘soft law’ and informal ‘best practices’ in setting regulatory standards for the promotion of 
financial inclusion (on which see Soederberg 2013). They are also, as a result, somewhat 
ambiguous documents that leave considerable scope for interpretation in translation into national 
and regional policy. 
 
Second, maybe more importantly, the BFA, HLPs, and the Sochi Accord are reflective of a 
growing regulatory emphasis on fintech as both a source of new risks and a key means of 
securing wider participation in financial markets by the ‘unbanked’. The sense throughout these 
guidelines is of fintech as a Janus-faced beast which might on one hand enable ever-wider access 
to ever-more-efficient financial markets, yet create new risks and regulatory challenges in so 
doing. The core appeal of fintech is very much pitched in terms of its ostensible capacity extend 
access to financial services -- for instance, a press release to accompany the announcement of the 
BFA quotes then-World Bank President Kim: ‘Countries are demanding deeper access to 
financial markets, and the World Bank Group will focus on delivering fintech solutions that 
enhance financial services, mitigate risks, and achieve stable, inclusive economic growth’ 
(World Bank 2018). The first point of the BFA identifies as the key (potential) benefits of 
expanded use of fintech primarily in terms of ‘inclusion’, access, and ‘deepening’ of financial 
activity: ‘increasing access to financial services and financial inclusion; deepening financial 
markets; and improving cross-border payments and remittance transfer systems’ (WB/IMF 2018: 
7).  
 
Yet, all three identify emergent challenges for financial stability and integrity. The BFA suggests 
that fintech enables financial activity to blur national boundaries, and that ‘These developments 
could lead to increased multipolarity and interconnectedness of the global financial system, 
potentially affecting the balance of risks for global financial stability’ (WB/IMF 2018: 9). In the 
HLPs in particular, a key emphasis is placed on limiting the potential for criminal activity, fraud, 
and other threats to ‘financial integrity’, noting that monitoring of risks is necessary to ‘build 
cyber resilience into financial markets and safeguard the financial system from illicit activities’ 
(GPFI 2016: 9). This is echoed in the Sochi Accord, which notes that ‘leveraging fintech for 
financial inclusion creates new regulatory challenges and poses cybersecurity, data privacy, 
money laundering and consumer protection-related risks’ (AFI 2018: 2). The underlying 
argument is centered on the need for regulators to balance emergent risks against the need to 
minimize regulatory barriers to entry for new firms. A key technique for doing so, discussed 
further below, has been to carve out time-bound or product-specific regulatory exceptions for 
experiments with new activities targeting the poor. So-called ‘regulatory sandboxes’ for fintech 
applications, discussed further below, are a key example (see Jenik and Lauer 2017). 
 Third, another important area of emphasis is on the importance of the physical infrastructures of 
financial markets. Point II of the BFA and principle 4 of the HLPs both focus specifically on 
improving the quality of ICT infrastructure. This could be read in the first instance as a 
recognition by policy makers of the materiality of markets – of the breadth of physical and 
informational substrates needed to enable financial transactions. But underlying both documents 
is a particular theory of how to deepen and strengthen those infrastructures, namely: if left the 
regulatory space to do so, markets will develop infrastructures on their own. It is up to regulators 
primarily to ensure reliable systems of personal identification and to prevent anti-competitive 
behavior by requiring inter-operability. 
 
Finally, the timing of these new initiatives centering on fintech for financial inclusion should not 
escape attention. They come on the heels of a decade of uneven results in terms of extending 
financial services to the ‘unbanked’. The World Bank’s series of ‘Findex’ surveys of global 
financial inclusion are the most comprehensive measures of ‘financial inclusion’. The headline 
figure is a reduction in the estimated number of ‘unbanked’ people (measured specifically by 
whether or not they have a bank account) from 2.5 billion in 2011, to 2 billion in 2014, and 1.7 
billion in 2017 (see Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015; 2018). 
However, this overstates the degree of progress. Significantly, the reduction in the number of 
‘unbanked’ is largely offset by a notable growth of dormant bank accounts. In the 2011 survey, 
the Bank estimated there were 150 million dormant accounts globally, roughly 10 percent of the 
global total (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012: 21), by 2014, these numbered 460 million, and 
15 percent of the global total (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015: 18), and 20 percent of accounts by 
2018 (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018: 64). Borrowing from formal financial institutions, moreover, 
continues to be heavily outweighed by borrowing from family and friends or informal lenders in 
most developing regions. As table 1 shows, the growth of ‘access’ to formal credit has been 
slow, uneven, and even prone to reversals in particular cases. Indeed, in the aggregate, the 
estimated proportion of people borrowing from formal financial institutions in the two lowest 
income quintiles in lower- and middle-income countries fell between 2011 and 2014, and had yet 
to return to 2011 levels in the latest survey in 2017. 
 
In brief, the BFA, Sochi Accord, and G20 HLPs reflect an emerging policy consensus that 
fintech is a potential means of overcoming increasingly evident obstacles to fostering greater 
‘inclusion’ and access to global financial markets. The underlying role in terms of governance is 
understood in terms of ensuring market ‘integrity’, the reliability of contracts, and increasingly 
the robustness, resilience, and accessibility of basic material telecommunications and data 
infrastructures. This is a vision of governance in which regulators are meant to play a 
considerable role in constituting markets, but primarily by ensuring competition and carving out 
spaces in which private investments can be made in infrastructures. 
 
In what follows, I argue that we can usefully both put this agenda in the context of the longer-
running failures of financial inclusion, and make sense of its limits, if we think about it in terms 
of its fundamentally neoliberal logics. Seen in this light, we can see the turn to technology less as 
a deepening of wider processes of ‘financialization’ (per Gabor and Brooks 2017; Aitken 2017) 
and more as a contingent development bound up with longer-running regulatory processes of 
failure, adaptation, and experimentation. The promotion of fintech is, at once, a recognition of 
the expanded range of activities needed to promote the development of markets, and a doubling 
down on a particular set of regulatory techniques and practices which have a longer history. 
Before turning to a discussion of this history, though, it is first useful to unpack the concept of 
‘neoliberalism’ more clearly. 
 
Table 1: Indicators of financial inclusion in selected countries 
Country Percent of Poorest Two Income 
Quintiles with a Bank Account 
  
Percent of Poorest Two Income Quintiles 
Borrowing from a Formal Financial Institution 
  
2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 
Brazil 39.4 58.5 56.6 4.9 7.5 7.4 
China 46.0 72.0 68.4 8.0 5.9 6.8 
Colombia 13.3 23.4 35.0 8.3 6.4 9.0 
El Salvador 6.1 21.6 19.3 3.6 13.5 6.6 
India 27.3 43.8 77.1 7.4 4.9 5.6 
Kenya 20.7 36.3 70.5 4.2 10.6 11.7 
Malaysia 50.4 75.6 80.5 2.9 15.2 9.3 
Mexico 11.9 28.6 25.8 5.3 6.5 4.0 
Nigeria 12.8 33.8 24.5 1.8 6.5 2.8 
Peru 5.2 18.4 27.0 8.6 7.4 7.3 
Philippines 10.7 14.9 18.0 4.8 8.2 5.2 
South Africa 38.8 56.5 62.6 4.7 4.2 7.1 
Tanzania 7.5 11.3 37.3 2.7 4.0 3.1 
Uganda 10.9 13.5 47.3 6.0 11.3 8.6 
Zimbabwe 24.1 16.3 43.6 2.9 2.2 0.9 
Low- and 
Middle-Income 
Countries Total 
29.1 44.8 54.2 7.7 6.8 7.5 
Source: World Bank Findex Data  
 
Neoliberalism, markets, risk 
Neoliberalism, it almost goes without saying, is often a slippery concept (Ferguson 2010; 
Venugopal 2015). It refers variously, or sometimes at once, to an intellectual agenda rooted in 
neoclassical economics, a political programme devoted to economic deregulation and 
marketization, and a ‘class-project’ -- an assault on global working classes on behalf of 
(financial) capital (see Harvey 2007; Selwyn 2014; Fine and Saad-Filho 2017). To label 
something ‘neoliberal’ is typically a form of critique in and of itself. In critical discussions of 
microcredit and financial inclusion, the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ has unquestionably often been 
used in this vein (e.g. Bateman 2010). Given the centrality of ‘financial inclusion’ to 
contemporary neoliberal development agendas, however, its travails arguably represent an 
important opportunity to reflect more broadly on the dynamics of neoliberalism.  
 
The troubled progress of financial inclusion would seem in the first instance to speak to a 
number of contributions which have highlighted the uneven and truncated character of processes 
of neoliberalization more broadly (see Peck 2010; 2013a; Brenner et al. 2010), and the continual 
dynamics of failure and adjustment that have often underlain such processes (see Peck 2010; 
Best 2016). This approach requires viewing neoliberalism as a set of logics, or a mode of reason, 
unfolding (unevenly) through particular regulatory projects (see Peck 2010; Konings 2016). As 
Mirowski (2009) and others have noted, a crucial organizing logic of neoliberal politics 
understood in this sense is an epistemic faith in the ‘market’, as an aggregate of individual 
speculative bets, as the most efficient means of processing information and allocating resources. 
Insofar as there is a core ‘neoliberal’ belief, then, it is that ‘prices in an efficient market “contain 
all relevant information” and therefore cannot be predicted by mere mortals’ (2009: 435). This 
has implications for neoliberalism as a political project – crucially, that ‘the market’, ‘(suitably 
reengineered and promoted) can always provide solutions to the problems seemingly caused by 
the market in the first place’ (Mirowski 2009: 439).  
 
We can usefully read the promotion of financial inclusion in general and of fintech in particular 
in this light. They represent part and parcel of a broader shift in neoliberal development 
governance towards increasingly more dispersed interventions aimed at making more and better 
information available in order to enable those ‘markets’ to work properly. The turn to technology 
could equally be read as a growing recognition of the materiality of markets and the need for 
concrete infrastructures to facilitate flows of information. The key point being: the promotion of 
fintech fits this wider logic of efforts at creating ‘suitably reengineered’ (Mirowski 2009: 436) 
markets in response to earlier failures.  
 
Here it is relevant to point out that a number of linked literatures have effectively pointed out 
that ‘markets’, as such, are neither neutral nor natural phenomena. A growing literature in 
economic sociology and geography, following Michel Callon (1998) and Donald MacKenzie 
(2006), has emphasized the ‘performative’ character of markets. This has entailed treating 
markets as ‘the contingent outcomes of the manner in which they are performed and reiterated', 
to use Boeckler and Berndt’s (2013: 425) terms. A good deal of emphasis has been placed here 
on the particular devices – standards, metrics, formulae, and socio-technical objects – through 
which market values are produced and rendered stable. Muniesa et al., for instance, note that 
‘Markets contain devices that aim at rendering things more “economic” or, more precisely, at 
enacting particular versions of what it is to be economic’ (2007: 4). On one level, the promotion 
of fintech is very much about tinkering with such devices in hopes of more effectively capturing 
a particular ‘version of what it is to be economic’.1 
 
Yet, the troublesome nature of the promotion of financial inclusion also points towards some 
more fundamental limits that neoliberal projects of ‘reengineering’ run up against. In particular, 
it calls attention to the contradictory configurations of labour and livelihoods needed for the 
construction of markets (cf. Peck 2013b). Increasingly, a key reason why the poor are held to 
need efficient financial markets is precisely to enable more effective management of fluctuating 
incomes. The G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion (discussed in the next section) 
for instance, note that ‘A crucial problem for poor people is that their incomes are not only low, 
but also irregular and unreliable… an annual average income of $2 a day may in actuality range 
from a high of $5 to low days when no income is earned’ (AFI 2010: 4). Access to financial 
services, then, is needed so that the poor can ‘manage this low, irregular and unreliable income 
to ensure regular cash flow and to accumulate sufficient amounts to cover lump sum payments’ 
(AFI 2010: 4). Yet, as argued further below, it is for precisely this reason that creating new 
financial markets for the poor has proven consistently difficult. 
 
Here a number of recent Marxian contributions to studies of ‘the market’ are useful insofar as 
they highlight the necessary interplay of productive activity and ‘fetishized’ market relations 
(e.g. Christophers 2014; Cahill 2019). This point has perhaps not been explored sufficiently in 
Marxian writing on financialization, which (notwithstanding notable debates among authors) has 
often made much of the distinction between ‘interest-bearing’ financial capital and productive 
capital, emphasizing the growing dominance of the former over the latter and the increasing 
disconnection of financial profits from production (e.g. Fine 2013; Fine and Saad-Filho 2016; 
Lapavitsas 2013). Workers’ incomes, insofar as they are considered in this process, are often 
understood as being subject to new forms of ‘financial expropriation’, in which consumption is 
increasingly mediated through the financial system (Lapavitsas 2013).  
 
                                                 
1 Aitken (2017) offers a closely cognate reading of emergent ‘alternative’ forms of credit data, arguing that they 
actively constitute the ‘unbanked’ as subjects legible to global financial markets. 
For present purposes, given the failure to construct functional markets at the core of this article, a 
slightly different reading of Marx is perhaps more helpful. The notion of commodity fetishism 
orienting Marxian discussion of markets is, at its core, about the fraught transformation of 
labour. Through its embodiment in circulating commodities, for Marx, ‘concrete labour becomes 
the form of the manifestation of its opposite, abstract human labour’ (Marx 1990: 150). Notably, 
Marx later observes that this dynamic of abstraction reaches its logical conclusion in circulations 
of money in financial markets. Here, ‘all that we see is the giving out and the repayment’ and 
‘everything that happens in between’— namely concrete productive activities that enable the 
repayment of debts and interest – is ‘obliterated’ (1991: 471). Importantly, though, this 
‘obliteration’ is only ever partially achieved. As Harvey notes, financial capital remains 
dependent on a ‘process of realization within the continual flow of production and consumption’ 
(2006: 95). Insofar as financial profits appear to be ‘decoupled’ from productive activities, or 
purely speculative, then, they represent ‘the capital mystification in its most flagrant form’ (Marx 
1991: 516, emphasis added).  
 
The corollary here is that financial markets, and particularly the kinds of consumer financial 
markets of interest in the promotion of financial inclusion, can’t be conjured easily. The 
(accordingly) troublesome and failure-prone character of neoliberal interventions has not often 
been given sufficient attention. There have been a number of important contributions which have 
sought to locate the sources of financial crises in the overextension of credit and inability of 
financial capital to realise returns in the ‘real’ economy -- per Harvey’s oft-cited aphorism, ‘no 
matter how far afield a privately contracted bill of exchange may circulate, it must always return 
to its place of origin for redemption’ (2006: 246). Froud et al. (2010), for instance, point to the 
inability of pre-crisis financial innovations in the US to overcome the ‘tyranny of earned 
income’. Soederberg (2014) somewhat similarly highlights the ways in which ‘debtfare’ policies 
seeking to govern poverty and social reproduction through the extension of new forms of credit 
have created systemic contradictions in the US and Mexico. But the other implication of the 
problem of ‘everything that goes on in between’ highlighted by Marx has received considerably 
less attention: namely, constructing financial markets in the first place is liable to be difficult in 
the absence of underlying configurations of labour social reproduction that enable regular 
payments of e.g. interest, premia, savings. The point here is that Marx’s reflections on markets 
and fetishism offer a useful way of thinking through the fundamental limits against which 
neoliberal projects aiming to conjure and re-engineer financial markets are likely to continually 
run up. It is both difficult for the poor to participate in markets, and unprofitable to construct new 
markets for them, for precisely the reason the poor are often held to need the construction of new 
markets, namely: low and unpredictable incomes.  
 
Indeed, these conditions appear to have become more common globally in the context of 
increasingly widespread austerity, the renewed commodification of housing and basic services, 
and stripping back of employment protections. It is beyond the scope of this article to argue this 
point at length, but there is something approaching consensus that the number of precarious and 
irregular livelihoods are on the rise in most places the context of wider neoliberal reforms (e.g. 
Selwyn 2014; 2019; Phillips 2016). Authors have identified important countervailing tendencies, 
including the widening of some kinds of social protection (e.g. Ferguson 2015; Harris and Scully 
2015), and argued that precarity can’t be solely attributed to neoliberal reforms as it is more 
deeply rooted in capitalist and colonial modes of exploitation (e.g. Harris and Scully 2015; 
Bernards 2018). But the general association between neoliberal reforms and increasingly 
precarious incomes, particularly of the poorest, seems to hold fairly widely. If we pay attention 
to ‘everything that goes on in between’, in short, we might suggest that financial inclusion has 
often run up against limits imposed by the effects of prior neoliberal reforms on labour and 
livelihoods across the global south.  
 
To pull these threads together, we can suggest that efforts to construct new markets for financial 
services in particular are dependent on configurations of labour and livelihoods enabling 
borrowers to repay credit, or pay insurance premiums, out of wages or other earnings. 
Highlighting the encounter between continual efforts to re-engineer markets and the 
configurations of productive and reproductive activities on which they rest offers us a crucial 
means of understanding the troubled progress of neoliberal reforms in general, and of slotting the 
turn to technology into the fraught history of neoliberal engagements in poverty finance more 
narrowly. In this context the appeal of ever-more fine-grained information with which to 
properly allocate credit can both be read as yet another attempt to ‘re-engineer’ the market 
(Mirowski 2009), but also a doomed project. In the next section, I start to flesh out this argument 
by tracing out the longer trajectory of failure and adaptation in neoliberal developmentalism 
underlying the recent turn to fintech.  
 
Situating the Turn to Technology 
As noted above, the turn to technology can be read as an emergent response to accumulating 
failures in promoting financial inclusion. We better understand the political dynamics at play by 
recognizing (1) that the project of financial inclusion itself needs to be read in the context of a 
longer cycle of failures and adaptations, and (2) that initial articulations of the financial inclusion 
agenda laid much of the groundwork for the consensus currently embodied in the Sochi Accord, 
G20 HLPs, and BFA.  
 
From microcredit to financial inclusion 
The emergence of microcredit as a development fad, notably, has its origins in responses to the 
failures of structural adjustment in the 1990s and 2000s. Microfinance, insofar as it was seen as a 
means of ‘empowering’ the poor in developing countries, particularly marginalized women (see 
Rankin 2001), by giving them access to credit that in theory would allow them to participate in 
entrepreneurial activities, exemplified a wider movement towards more dispersed forms of 
development practice aimed at producing markets more directly (see Cammack 2004).  
 
In practice, though, the fact that microcredit remained heavily dependent on public subsidies led 
the World Bank in particular to seek to shift microfinance operations onto more explicitly 
commercial bases. Particularly notable here are efforts, often driven by the World Bank from the 
early 2000s, to promote the ‘sustainability’ of microcredit by forging linkages to global capital 
markets. This often took the form of mechanisms to facilitate the flow of information to 
investors, particularly through the establishment of micro-credit rating techniques, ‘Microcredit 
Investment Vehicles’, and the securitization of microloans (see Aitken 2013; Soederberg 2014; 
Henriksen 2013).  
 
Commercial microcredit failed. While broader problems with microcredit are well-rehearsed 
elsewhere (see Rankin 2001; Maclean 2013; Bateman 2010; Taylor 2012; Bateman et al. 2018), 
it’s worth noting two things. First, commercial MFIs rarely lent money to the poorest. Even 
microfinance advocates often had to concede that ‘most institutions serving the poorest 
borrowers attract profit rates too small to attract profit-maximizing investors’ (Cull et al. 2009: 
13), pointing to a ‘profit-outreach tradeoff’. Second, where micro-loans were made, studies 
accumulated revising claims about positive impacts downwards to enabling ‘consumption 
smoothing’ rather than entrepreneurial investments that would raise incomes (see Bateman 2010; 
Taylor 2012). These questionable positive impacts were compounded by crises prompting 
concerns about overindebtedness -- most notably the October 2010 suicides of highly indebted 
farmers in Andhra Pradesh, India (see Taylor 2011; 2012).  
 
Microfinance initiatives have persisted – and have even been transported into new territories in 
the global north (Gerard and Johnson 2019). However, microfinance has increasingly been 
subsumed into a wider agenda of ‘financial inclusion’ since 2010. An important step here was 
the announcement of the ‘G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion’ in 2010 (AFI 2010) 
and the subsequent Maya Declaration on Financial Inclusion in 2011. This turn to ‘financial 
inclusion’ does represent a shift from the ‘microcredit’ agenda in some ways (see Mader 2018). 
In the first instance, ‘financial inclusion’ shifts objectives away from poverty reduction per se 
and towards the extension of formal saving and lending to the poor in and of itself (see Taylor 
2012). This move implies a different understanding of the role of finance in enabling 
development. ‘Financial sector deepening’ is held to be necessary for the effective allocation of 
resources to enable ‘inclusive growth’ and for the management of risks on an individual level. 
Relatedly, ‘financial inclusion’ implies access to a wider range of financial tools beyond 
microcredit, especially including savings, payment systems, and insurance (AFI 2010: 1).  
 
There is thus a shift here in terms of the way that financial markets are perceived to enable 
poverty reduction – it is much less a question of allocating resources to entrepreneurs, and much 
more a means of developing markets for the provision of risk management. Importantly, linked 
to this shift has been a growing recognition of a wider range of material and informational 
infrastructures needed to facilitate the development of these markets. 
 
Technology and financial inclusion in and after the G20 Principles 
The G20 principles and Maya Declaration lay much of the groundwork for subsequent 
discussions of technology for financial inclusion. Two points are important. First, the G20 
principles place a heavy emphasis on ‘transaction costs’ as a limit on access to finance. On its 
first page, the AFI report outlining the G20 principles notes that ‘As a general rule, transaction 
costs do not vary in direct proportion to a transaction’s size. Thus serving the poor with small 
value services is simply not viable using conventional retail banking or insurance approaches’ 
(AFI 2010: 1). New technologies, especially mobile transactions, and ‘innovation’ more broadly, 
are increasingly identified as key means of reducing these costs. A recent report from McKinsey 
and Company, for instance, argues that: ‘Every step towards the full digitalization of financial 
services helps reduce costs, making it profitable for providers to serve a much larger range of 
customers’ (McKinsey & Co. 2016: 31).  
 
New forms of mobile payment systems are perhaps the paradigmatic example here (see Maurer 
2012). Most prominently, M-Pesa -- a mobile payment system operated by South African 
telecoms provider Vodacom, first established in Kenya -- has grown dramatically, expanding 
into conventional banking services, following its establishment in 2007. M-Pesa is frequently 
explicitly cited as an example of good practice, in the AFI report and elsewhere (e.g. Suri and 
Jack 2016). For instance, the McKinsey report cited above makes note of the reach of mobile 
money in Kenya -- where nearly 70 percent of adults have a mobile money account -- as 
supporting evidence for the claim that ‘a growing majority of people in emerging economies now 
own a mobile phone, which can give them ready access to financial services’, and dramatically 
lower costs for financial institutions to serve ‘poorer and more remote consumers’ (McKinsey & 
Co. 2016: 31). The key claim here is that mobile technologies can enable the rapid and 
inexpensive extension of financial systems to populations that would normally be excluded from 
participation in mainstream financial markets by physical barriers resulting in overly high 
transaction costs, particularly because cellular networks are comparatively easy to set up in 
remote areas. A recent G20 report on financial inclusion, indeed, notes explicitly: ‘Digital 
technologies have reached developing countries much faster than previous technological 
innovations; this is illustrated by the fact that households in developing countries are more likely 
to own a mobile phone than to have access to electricity or improved sanitation’ (GPFI 2017: 9). 
As Maurer very aptly notes, this set of claims also includes, ‘de facto, an argument for the 
privatisation of infrastructure development, as well as “regulatory flexibility”, and often, a retreat 
of the regulatory state’ (2012: 593).  
 
It’s here that the second key point about the understanding of technology in the G20 principles 
and Maya Declaration becomes clear. The key mechanism by which ‘innovation’ is meant to 
take place is by allowing the ‘regulatory space’ for private sector experiments with new 
technologies and new modes of service delivery that might lower costs. This is explicit on the 
first page of the G20 principles report: 
Financial sector policy and regulation is critical to the use of technology to 
promote financial inclusion. Increasing numbers of countries with large excluded 
populations are pioneering policy and regulatory innovations that open space for 
financial inclusion and similar new approaches to the delivery of formal financial 
services. (AFI 2010: 1, emphasis added) 
It is also echoed in the Maya Declaration's commitment to create an ‘enabling environment to 
harness new technology that increases access and lowers costs’ (AFI 2011: 2). There is an 
underlying commitment here to a kind of targeted de-regulation – selective, bounded changes to 
regulatory requirements might encourage private investments in particular activities. This logic 
has played a significant role in shaping the ways in which regulators have involved themselves in 
promoting fintech applications, discussed further in the next section. 
 
Making fintech 
This final section returns to the specific trajectories of the ‘turn to technology’, and explores its 
limits. In the period since the AFI report, the transaction costs narrative from the 2010 G20 
principles, and exemplified by mobile money, is increasingly coupled with a diagnosis of slow 
progress in promoting financial inclusion as a product of the absence of adequate data with 
which to assess credit and insurance risks. In the words of one group of consultants, where 
lenders in the global north can rely on paystubs, property registers, and detailed credit histories, 
‘such data are often lacking in the global south’, leaving lenders and insurers ‘unable to properly 
understand their consumers and assess their risk, either forcing them to charge high interest rates 
to protect against unforeseen risk or discouraging them from serving new markets’ 
(Insight2Impact 2016: 4).   
 To some extent this is reflective of longstanding concerns, particularly for the World Bank. The 
Bank organized a task force to propose a set of basic principles on credit reporting in 2011. The 
report made mention of the implications of improved credit information for lending: ‘Improved 
information flows also provide the basis for fact-based and quick credit assessments, thus 
facilitating access to credit and other financial products to a larger number of borrowers with a 
good credit history’ (World Bank 2011: 1). But this was decidedly a secondary concern here to 
issues of market ‘integrity’. The World Bank’s Doing Business reports have also regularly 
pointed to a positive correlation between credit bureau coverage and private credit as a share of 
GDP (2016: 59). But increasingly these concerns are raised in terms of their implications for 
financial inclusion. Importantly, digital technologies, both new forms of data and techniques for 
processing them, are increasingly seen as solutions which might help avoid the long, laborious, 
and costly work of building up credit information infrastructures. A report commissioned by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) notes that ‘alternative analytics… help develop more 
robust client risk profiles at a fraction of what it would cost to compile such information 
manually’ (Hoder et al. 2016: 18). The key point here is that fintech applications respond to 
discrete challenges of market construction that have been repeatedly identified in two decades’ 
worth of interventions.  
 
The World Bank and G20, together with a number of central banks and financial regulators in 
both global north and south, have also increasingly promoted and coordinated targeted regulatory 
frameworks for fintech applications aimed at promoting ‘access’ to finance for the ‘unbanked’. 
Recently, CGAP in particular has promoted ‘regulatory sandboxes’ -- time-limited, product 
specific licenses for particular companies to conduct ‘experiments’ with ‘innovative’ practices 
and technologies (see Jenik and Lauer 2017). The concept was first implemented by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the US in 2012, and have been announced or 
implemented increasingly in low- or middle-income countries including Malaysia, India, 
Mauritius, Brazil, Mexico, Jordan, Kenya, Sierra Leone, China, and Thailand. In early 2018, the 
UK’s Financial Conduct Authority proposed the development of a ‘global sandbox’. This was 
subsequently taken up by CGAP and a range of financial regulators through the proposed 
formation of a ‘Global Financial Innovation Network’ in August of 2018 to facilitate 
coordination between financial regulators (GFIN 2018). GFIN launched a pilot programme for 
cross-border experiments in early 2019 (FCA 2019). This can usefully be read as an extension of 
earlier techniques for promoting ‘enabling regulatory environments’.  
 
Another increasingly important form of support has been providing financial and in-kind support 
to particular fintech firms. The Entrepreneurial Finance Lab (EFL), for instance, a key fintech 
firm developing ‘psychometric’ credit scoring practices was developed out of a 2006 research 
initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School. It was incorporated as a private company in 2010, and 
subsequently attracted funding from a number of different bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies. In 2013, the project was funded by the G20’s ‘SME Finance Challenge’, an initiative 
launched alongside the G20’s Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion and managed by the 
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, that included funding from the governments of 
Canada, the US, the UK, Korea, and the Netherlands (SME Finance Forum 2014). A number of 
subsequent pilot studies were sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
World Bank and carried out in Latin America. The IADB facilitated and published studies co-
authored by EFL staff testing models developed in the project discussed above with SME 
borrowers in Argentina (Klinger et al. 2013b) and Peru (Klinger et al. 2013c). A similar pilot 
project was carried out by World Bank staff in Peru in 2012 (Arráiz et al. 2015a; 2015b). EFL 
subsequently merged with Big Data credit scorer Lenndo in late 2017. 
 
When set in the context of the uneven progress of the ‘financial inclusion’ agenda, growing 
attention to technology appears to reflect a further revision of neoliberal understandings of 
market-building. Where the promotion of commercial microfinance, and the early promotion of 
financial inclusion tended to emphasize the construction of institutional vehicles to facilitate 
access to global capital markets and standardized forms of information, the ‘turn to technology’ 
represents a shift towards engagements with the minute, material elements of the devices needed 
to mobilize information and set prices.  
 
What can fintech do? 
It might be useful here to highlight the kinds of technologies that have emerged in this context. 
‘Alternative’ forms of credit data are perhaps especially salient; two major developments are 
notable.  
 
First are applications of ‘Big Data’ and machine-learning algorithms in credit scoring for the 
‘unbanked’. Big data applications have proliferated, if unevenly, in recent years in global finance 
more generally (see Cambell-Verduyn et al. 2017). In contrast to what might be called ‘small’ 
data -- produced directly through controlled sampling techniques limiting scope, time-frame, 
size, and variety -- Big Data are produced continually, in high volume, varied, and often as a by-
product of the normal operation of information technologies rather than through direct 
investigative processes (see Kitchin and Lauriault 2015). The analysis of such mass volumes of 
data is made possible by the application of computerized algorithms which are distinguished 
from the static ‘models’ used in traditional statistical analyses by their dynamic and recursive 
character (Beer 2016). Big Data, particularly in the context of growing mobile phone and internet 
use in developing countries, are seen as a vital source of alternative credit scoring for ‘unbanked’ 
consumers: 
The increased use of digital technologies by [micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs)] and their customers is generating a wealth of new data that can be used 
to understand the MSME market, assess creditworthiness, and manage risk more 
effectively. A growing number of financial technology companies, known as 
‘fintechs’, are developing innovative tools to do precisely this. As a result, 
traditional financial institutions are faced with both a unique challenge and an 
enormous opportunity. (Hoder et al. 2016: 7) 
A notable example here is the start-up Cignifi, which aims to produce alternative credit scores on 
the basis of potential borrowers’ mobile phone use. Cignifi has developed a proprietary 
algorithm that uses on a behavioural model drawing on data on calls and texts received per day, 
along with patterns of web and social network usage, to assess the creditworthiness of mobile 
users who can then be selectively targeted for financial products. This is licensed out to 
telecommunications operators and financial service providers (see Aitken 2017). 
 
Second, there have also been efforts to develop alternative forms of ‘small’ data for evaluating 
credit in the absence of formal credit histories and employment or property records. Most 
prominent, perhaps, are so-called ‘psychometric’ credit scores (see Bernards, 2019; Aitken 
2017). Psychometric tests aim to quantify cognitive attributes for the purpose of screening 
individuals’ suitability for certain tasks. They originated in efforts to develop ‘scientific’ 
techniques for hiring (see Schmidt and Hunter 1998). One of the highest profile such systems has 
been developed by the Entrepreneurial Finance Lab (EFL). EFL has developed a test drawing on 
measures of intelligence and ‘integrity’ which is administered to potential borrowers lacking 
detailed credit histories (see Klinger et al. 2013a). The test is normally administered by computer 
in a bank branch, but the company has developed online and mobile versions in some settings as 
well. In the case of either ‘big’ or ‘small’ forms of data, though, the basic point is that adopting 
alternative forms of credit data -- often as means of assessing the psychological character of 
borrowers rather than their more opaque economic circumstances -- is framed as a way of 
diminishing collateral requirements and interest rates that might otherwise disqualify MSMEs 
from formal borrowing.  
 
The possibility of expanding loan portfolios to irregular workers without increasing default risk 
is the core promise made by advocates of new forms of credit scoring. As the above IADB report 
puts it, this ‘presents a significant opportunity to expand MSME portfolios at a lower cost than 
was previously possible, while maintaining acceptable levels of risk’ (Hoder et al. 2016: 18). 
EFL echoes these arguments. While noting that psychometric credit scores are unable to match 
the predictive power of detailed credit histories, ‘In an information scarce setting, a tool that can 
signal a 50 % increase in default risk is a useful signal and can identify a profitable subset of an 
overall population that is too risky to lend to and otherwise indistinguishable’ (Klinger et al. 
2013a: 43). Experiments with fintech are increasingly explicitly articulated, in short, around the 
livelihood activities of the ‘unbanked’.  
 
There is already something of a contradiction at work here with respect to inclusion. There is a 
logic of segmentation, stratification, and exclusion – of sorting out those able to profitably 
participate in credit markets from those ‘too risky’ to do so – at play in the development of 
alternative forms of credit data (Aitken 2017: 291). Some hints about the limits of the turn to 
technology in terms of promoting inclusion are made more evident by considering the wider 
trajectory above. New forms of stratification seem unlikely to overcome the underlying ‘profit-
outreach tradeoff’ (Cull et al. 2009). Indeed, as Mader (2018) rightly argues, financial capital has 
continued to ‘cherry pick’ its engagements with the agenda of financial inclusion, primarily 
through high-interest loans to the urban, ‘less poor’. Fintech applications ultimately promise, at 
best, more fine-grained forms of cherry-picking. They don’t help to solve the more fundamental 
underlying problem, which is simply that irregular and precarious incomes are exceedingly 
difficult to convert into predictable ‘asset streams’ (Leyshon and Thrift 2007) amenable to 
financial speculation. This trajectory is usefully understood in terms of the ongoing confrontation 
between neoliberal logics of perpetually re-engineered marketization, particularly the emphasis 
on markets as processors of information, and ‘all that goes on in between’ (Marx 1991) in terms 
of productive activity and livelihoods in order to enable commodified, fetishized market 
activities. The turn to technology represents a continuation of particular regulatory logics 
implicit in previous interventions to promote microfinance and financial inclusion, without 
addressing the underlying challenges that have hampered these projects. 
 
Conclusion 
In the above, I have shown how the turn to technology in financial inclusion slots into a longer 
trajectory of failures and mutations of neoliberal development governance. It clearly 
encapsulates a trend towards experimentation and provisional governance in response to repeated 
failures. The turn to technology also fails to move beyond the more fundamental challenges 
stemming from the problematic construction of ‘markets’ underlying neoliberal reasoning. There 
is a particular (neo)liberal logic underlying these developments. The BFA, Sochi Accord, and 
G20 HLPs can be read in the first instance as reflections of an emergent consensus around how 
‘suitably re-engineered and promoted’ (Mirowski 2009) markets for financial services for the 
poor might be brought about through appropriately nurtured technological innovation. In 
concluding here, I argue that it remains questionable whether building such infrastructures, in 
and of itself, is enough to enable the constitution of new forms of financial markets. The turn to 
technology, I argue here, is better understood as a fraught and failure-prone effort to re-engineer 
financial markets that might effectively serve borrowers with irregular and unpredictable 
incomes. 
 We usefully understand what’s at stake in this turn to technology if we understand it in terms of 
neoliberal governance. The turn to technology in short, represents an effort to make an end-run 
around a long-running and critical paradox in the ‘financial inclusion’ agenda by ‘re-
engineering’ (per Mirowski 2009) financial markets – this time with interventions aimed at 
infrastructural components of financial practice, tinkering with the devices through which market 
relations are enacted (see Muniesa et al. 2007). But this is an effort that seems destined to 
continue to founder on the problem of ‘everything that goes on in between’, per Marx (1991). 
This is perhaps especially significant because it suggests dynamics of failure and adaptation that 
readings of fintech and financial inclusion in terms of ‘financialization’ are likely to miss. 
 
This matters because it underlines just how far ‘fintech’ is a political phenomenon, in the sense 
of being bound up with the promotion of particular political projects by national and global 
regulators. It represents (yet another) contingent and fraught effort to tinker at the margins of 
neoliberal development models. Analyses that start from the premise that fintech is part and 
parcel of wider processes of ‘financialization’, whatever their other important contributions, are 
likely to miss this important aspect of the underlying politics of ‘innovation’. The turn to 
technology is perhaps not so much a sign of the ‘inescapability’ of finance (per Hall 2012) as it is 
of continued efforts to grapple with the recurrent failures of neoliberal efforts to build and re-
engineer financial markets. 
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